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The Antitrust Reform Act altered the Justice Department '.s treatment of
antitrust conspirators who come forward to cooperate in the prosecution of
conspiracies. Under the prior Leniency Policy, the first cooperating
conspirator was immune from criminal prosecution but remained jointly and
severally liable for treble damages. Under the new Act, the amnesty applicant
avoids criminal penalties and limits its civil liability to actual damages. Though
the theory of the Act was to increase incentives to abandon and reveal antitrust
conspiracies, this Comment suggests that the Act will have a consequence
Congress did not intend: depriving antitrust plaintiffs offull recovery of treble
damage awards. Because joint and several liability for treble damages
disproportionately hurts deep-pocketed conspirators, the incentives under the
new policy may cause deep pockets to take advantage of the Leniency Policy.
This may result in more conspiracies coming to light, but it leaves plaintiffs to
collect from conspirators who are more likely to be insolvent. This detrimental
effect on plaintiffs' recovery could jeopardize the effectiveness of private
antitrust enforcement. In a complex remedial scheme, Congress must consider
the effects of changes to one element of the scheme on all the others.
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Introduction
Proponents of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform
Act (Antitrust Reform Act) of 20041 tout the statute's increased incentives for
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected June 2006; Harvard Business School, M.B.A. 2003.
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conspirators to cooperate with the Department of Justice and its enhanced
measures for deterring antitrust conspiracies. 2 In particular, the Act de-trebles
civil damages for antitrust conspirators who cooperate with the Justice
Department through its Corporate Leniency Program. Discussions of the
efficacy of the Act's reforms, however, ignore the potential harm to antitrust
victims of the Act's de-trebling provision.3 This Comment argues that a
collateral consequence of the new scheme may be to harm the potential for
antitrust victims to recover the entirety of their treble damage awards. It
concludes that the de-trebling provision provides incentives for conspirators
with the deepest pockets to cooperate, leaving victims to claim recovery from
the less solvent conspirators. While Congress purportedly considered the
interests of antitrust victims in enacting the de-trebling provision, it overlooked
the ways that de-trebling may sacrifice the interests of individual victims-in
terms of recoverability of damage awards-in exchange for a general increase
in the detection of conspiracies. Antitrust victims continue to be legally entitled
to treble damages, but analysis of the new incentives demonstrates how the Act
may hamper recoverability in practice.
The Justice Department's Corporate Leniency Policy ("Leniency Policy")
grants amnesty from criminal prosecution to the first conspirator to come
forward and cooperate ("amnesty applicant") in the prosecution of its co-
conspirators. Prior to the Antitrust Reform Act, amnesty applicants continued
to be jointly and severally liable for treble damages in the resulting civil suits
brought by antitrust victims. 4 However, as a result of the success of the earlier
amendments to the Leniency Policy,5 Congress revisited the incentives for
I Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 665 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and
accompanying notes).
2 In a speech given shortly after the passage of the amendments, Acting Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Scott Hammond emphasized the benefits of the amendments, which simultaneously
increased criminal penalties for conspirators and de-trebled damages for amnesty applicants:
[T]he amendment likely will (1) increase the number of criminal antitrust conspiracies that are
exposed and prosecuted; (2) increase compensation to victims of criminal antitrust
conspiracies through the required cooperation provided to the victims by the amnesty
applicant; (3) further de-stabilize, and deter the formation of, criminal antitrust conspiracies by
creating an additional major incentive to self-report the violation; (4) reduce the costs of
investigating and prosecuting criminal antitrust conspiracies; and (5) reduce the cost for
victims to recover the damages they suffer from criminal antitrust conspiracies.
Scott Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech to the
American Bar Association Midwinter Leadership Meeting: An Overview of Recent Developments in the
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program (Jan. 10, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.pdf).
3 Senator Hatch, one of the bill's sponsors, "expect[ed] that the total compensation to victims
of antitrust conspiracies [would] be increased because of the requirement that amnesty applicants
cooperate [with civil plaintiffs.]" 150 CONG. REC. S3610, S3614 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) [hereinafter Hatch Statements].
4 The policy prior to the Antitrust Reform Act is available at Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,113
(Aug. 10, 1993).
5 The 1993 Amendments resulted in an increase in leniency applicants from one per year
before the reforms to an average of two per month by 1999. See Kylie Cooper & Adrienne C. Dejinou,
Twentieth Survey of White Collar Crime: Antitrust Violations, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 179, 207 & n. 181
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antitrust conspirators to self-report and cooperate with investigators. The
Antitrust Reform Act creates an enhanced set of incentives for antitrust
conspirators to cooperate. Under the new regime, the Leniency Policy not only
affords immunity from criminal prosecution to the first conspirator to cooperate
with the Justice Department's criminal investigation but also limits the amnesty
applicant's civil liability to actual damages. 6 Prior to this de-trebling provision,
a conspirator had to weigh the likelihood of a successful civil suit against the
benefits of criminal immunity before coming forward to cooperate with the
Justice Department. In removing the threat of large civil damages awards as a
disincentive to cooperate, Congress may have hurt the interests of antitrust
victims in recovering the full amount of the treble damages owed by the
conspirators.
I. The Dual Track Enforcement Regime
In permitting parallel criminal and civil enforcement of antitrust laws,
Congress deputized citizens as private attorneys general and entitled them to
treble damages in return for their role in enforcing antitrust laws. Since the
1960s, private enforcement has become the "bulwark of anti-trust
enforcement." 7 Enforcement by victims qua private attorneys general has not
infrequently preceded criminal indictment by the Justice Department,
8
suggesting that civil suits serve a function in detecting and exposing
conspiracies as well as enforcing antitrust laws. To encourage civil plaintiffs to
bring these suits, section 7 of the Sherman Act first permitted automatic awards
of treble damages in antitrust civil suits.9 The purpose of granting treble
damages to private parties is two-fold:' 0 compensating antitrust victims and
(2005); see also Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Address Before the Bar Association of the District of Columbia's 35th Annual Symposium on
Associations and Antitrust: Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse: The Antitrust
Division's Corporate Leniency Policy-An Update (Feb. 16, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247.pdf). At the same time, the criminal prosecutions have
resulted in higher fines. See James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Address at ABA Antitrust Section 49th Annual Spring Meeting: Status Report:
Criminal Fines (Mar. 28, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/8063.pdf).
6 See Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 213(a), 118 Stat. 665, 666 (2004).
7 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
8 See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Market Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,350 (N.D. I11. Apr.
4, 1996). In fact, the civil suit in NASDAQ appears to have sparked both the Justice Department's
investigation and the SEC's investigation. NASDAQ, 169 F.R.D. at 498-501.
9 This provision was later re-enacted as section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
10 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the twin goals of private enforcement action. See,
e.g., AtI. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490
U.S. 93, 102 (1989); Am. Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575
(1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); I11. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746
(1977); id. at 748, 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502
(1969); see also Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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encouraging enforcement of the antitrust laws by private parties." This
enforcement goal necessarily also has deterrence effects. 12 Impairing victims'
ability to recover treble damages awards may impair the effectiveness of the
private enforcement system.
The related doctrine of- joint and several liability, a judge-made
requirement, has often meant that one defendant with the deepest pockets, or
highest net worth, is liable for the entirety of the civil award. ' 3 In declaring that
there is no common law right of contribution in antitrust cases, the Supreme
Court invited Congress to create such a right, 14 but none of the congressional
proposals have proven successful. 15 Antitrust plaintiffs have the extra assurance
that the defendant with the deepest pockets will be forced to pay for the entire
award; consequently, less wealthy conspirators avoid paying their portion of
the bill.
The Antitrust Reform Act introduced a package of incentives to encourage
cooperation with the Justice Department along with increased penalties to the
11 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) ("[T]he
purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide
private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws."); United States
v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1954) (discussing the dual track enforcement mechanism of
criminal prosecution and civil suit with treble damages); see also City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F. 23, 29 (6th Cir. 1903), affd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) ("It is not reasonable
to construe the remedy so conferred as a penal action, for that would be to add to the punishment by fine
or imprisonment imposed by the other sections of the act an additional punishment by way of pecuniary
penalty. The plain intent is to compensate the person injured. True, the compensation is to be three times
the damage sustained. But this enlargement of compensation is not enough to constitute the action a
penal action .... ).
12 Some scholars have suggested that even two-thirds of the treble damages are compensatory
rather than punitive. See, e.g., Robert H. Landes, Are Antitrust "'Treble" Damages Really Single
Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 123 (1993); Lawrence Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-
trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 157-58 (1940). From the perspective of deterrence,
others have described the treble damages as a multiplier necessary to counteract the possibility of
escaping detection. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2, at 223-30 (4th ed. 1992).
Other scholars have criticized the deterrence aspect of private enforcement. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins,
An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 413, 444-45 (1997)
("With government penalties increased so substantially, antitrust class actions can no longer be justified
reflexively as essential for deterrence. When a firm has paid hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and
seen its executives dragged off to prison, it is not self-evident that additional punishment is needed to
achieve the correct level of deterrence.").
13 See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 47-48 (5th ed.
1984). See generally Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble
Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1283
(1987) (describing as one of the standard criticisms ofjoint and several liability that "it is possible that a
deep-pocket defendant, who had only peripheral involvement in the conspiracy or reaped only minor
benefits, [can] be held liable for all of a treble damages judgment").
14 In 1981, the Supreme Court held that there was no common law right of contribution in
antitrust cases, concluding that Congress must provide for such rights explicitly. Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
15 Congress has considered several proposals to create a right of contribution among antitrust
defendants but has never passed one. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLIES AND
COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., REPORT ON THE PROPOSED
LEGISLATION TO ALLOCATE DAMAGES AMONG DEFENDANTS IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 1-2,
reprinted in 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 280 (Feb: 10, 1983).
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Sherman Act enforcement regime. The Act provides a potent new incentive for
self-reporting: In return for cooperation with the Justice Department's
prosecuting of antitrust co-conspirators, an amnesty applicant limits its civil
liability to actual damages. 16 The Act also requires amnesty applicants to
cooperate with victims in civil suits. 17 The remaining conspirators continue to
be jointly and severally liable for the remainder of the treble damages owed to
victims less the actual damages attributable to the amnesty applicant. In
addition, the Act significantly increased criminal penalties for conspirators.
18
While the new regime is still too new to evaluate conclusively, some
commentators believe that it will produce more cooperation with the Justice
Department and ultimately result in an increased number of both successful
criminal prosecutions and civil awards for victims.19
II. Congressional Concern with Civil Recovery
The Act's legislative history indicates that Congress considered the
interests of civil plaintiffs and concluded that they would not be harmed by the
new proposals. According to its sponsors, the aim of the reforms was to
"enhance the Justice Department's existing leniency program to encourage
more antitrust criminal wrongdoers to come forward and thereby significantly
assist the Department in detecting and preventing antitrust conspiracies." 20 The
Antitrust Reform Act received very little discussion in floor debates of both
chambers and was signed into law by President Bush in June 2004.
While most of Congress's discussion concerned the promise of increased
detection and deterrence, the bill's sponsors emphasized that victims' interests
would not be harmed. One of the bill's supporters explained: "[B]ecause all
other conspirator firms would remain jointly and severably liable for three
times the total damages caused by the conspiracy, the victims' potential total
recovery would not be reduced by [the Act's de-trebling provision].'
Congress intended for antitrust plaintiffs to incur no negative effects from the
changes in liability. On the day of its passage, Representative Scott stressed
that "the victims' potential recovery [will] not [be] reduced by leniency in this
situation. ' 22 Instead, the bill's sponsors believed that the likely increase in
detection of conspiracies combined with the cooperation of the amnesty
applicant would cause "total compensation to victims of antitrust conspiracies
16 Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 213(a), 118 Stat. 665, 666 (2004).
17 Id. § 213(b) (requiring an applicant to be available for "interviews, depositions, or
testimony in connection with the civil action as [plaintiffs] may reasonably require").
18 The Antitrust Reform Act raised the maximum Sherman Act corporate fine to $ 100
million, the maximum individual fine to $1 million, and the maximum Sherman Act jail term to ten
years. Id. § 215.
19 See, e.g., Hatch Statements, supra note 3.
20 149 CONG. REc. S13,517, S13,520 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
21 Hatch Statements, supra note 3.
22 150 CONG. REC. H3654, H3659 (daily ed. June 2, 2004).
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[to] be increased., 23 However, these assertions are flawed. As explained in the
following section, the recoverability of antitrust damage awards may suffer
under the new regime. Additionally, the cooperation of an amnesty applicant in
a civil case is likely to help the plaintiff only in proving liability and damages
but not in recovering the damages awarded from the remaining defendants if
they are judgment-proof.24
III. The Effects of the De-Trebling Provision
While Congress considered the prospect of increased self-reporting, it did
not appear to analyze which conspirators would be the most likely to cooperate
under the new regime. A brief comparison of the incentives before and after the
de-trebling provision suggests that Congress ignored the likely effect of the
relative solvency and net worths of individual conspirators on their incentives
to cooperate. The following analysis assumes a basic price-fixing conspiracy
among a small number of competitors and likely Justice Department criminal
enforcement with subsequent civil antitrust suits.
26
The Leniency Policy creates incentives for conspirators to defect from the
27conspiracy and cooperate with the Justice Department. Each conspirator in a
price-fixing conspiracy is faced with two options: cooperate with the Justice
Department by becoming the amnesty applicant or do not cooperate with the
Justice Department and continue in the conspiracy (but risk being caught by a
Justice Department investigation). While it is economically advantageous for
all of the conspirators to continue the conspiracy, the ever-present risk of
23 See Hatch Statements, supra note 3.
24 Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a civil plaintiff to prove three elements: (i) an
agreement to concerted action, such as a combination or conspiracy formed by two or more entities; (ii)
the agreement unreasonably restrained trade or commerce; and (iii) the restrained trade or commerce is
interstate or international. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). However, civil antitrust plaintiffs have a light
burden in proving the amount of damages once they have established liability, see Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946), and section 5 of the Sherman Act permits a favorable
verdict in a government antitrust prosecution to serve as prima facie evidence in a subsequent private
antitrust action. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000).
25 Similar analyses have revealed how treble damages and joint liability affect the game
dynamics in the settlement process of antitrust civil suits. See Cavanagh, supra note 13, at 1289 n.68;
John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble
Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 42 (1980).
26 In order to isolate the effects of the de-trebling provision, the analysis presented here
involves several simplifying assumptions. It ignores settlement dynamics in both the civil and criminal
actions, the potential for other international and state enforcement actions, and the FTC's enforcement
activities. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Symposium: Private Law, Punishment, and
Disgorgement: The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 207 (2003). As noted
previously, some antitrust conspiracies are increasingly brought to light first by civil suits. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text. Because the Leniency Policy does not grant immunity retroactively, the
analysis presented here applies only to those cases in which the criminal investigation precedes the civil
action.
27 The terms of the Leniency Policy permit only the first conspirator to receive amnesty.
Therefore, multiple conspirators cannot cooperate and receive the benefits of immunity. See ANTITRUST
DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091 .pdf [hereinafter LENIENCY POLICY].
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detection means that there is always a temptation for one conspirator to inform
on the others. If a conspirator comes forward to report the conspiracy to the
Justice Department and cooperates with the investigation, it will avoid criminal
liability. Detection of the conspiracy, including through the revelations of an
amnesty applicant, also potentially produces civil suits against the conspirators
with awards of treble damages. At the outset, none of the conspirators knows
how the treble damage award will be allocated-to one or all of them-so they
must assume the probability-adjusted risk of bearing the entire amount of treble
damages.
28
Under the old regime, each of the conspirators was jointly and severally
liable for the entire award of treble damages. Thus, the risk of one defendant's
insolvency was borne by the other conspirators and sometimes entirely by the
conspirator with the deepest pockets. Any individual conspirator would
cooperate with the Justice Department only where the immunity from criminal
penalties outweighed the likelihood of paying civil damages. Thus, a
conspirator would have to assess two variables: (1) the likelihood that one of its
co-conspirators comes forward first, thus exposing the conspirator to criminal
prosecution and civil suit (or the same consequences occurring through the
Justice Department's independent discovery of the conspiracy), and (2) the
probability of bearing the entire treble damage award. The amendments to the
Corporate Leniency Program rely on calculations of this second factor to
induce individual conspirators to come forward.
The rational conspirator would cooperate with the Justice Department
only when the probability weighted penalties from cooperation exceed those
from not cooperating. Under the previous regime, conspirators faced criminal
fines of up to $10 million as well as joint and several liability for treble
damages. Since the gain of avoiding criminal penalties comes only through
increasing the risk of exposure to treble civil damages, those companies most
likely to bear the treble damages risk the most from cooperation. Under this
regime, those conspirators with the lowest probability of having to pay the
treble damages awards would be more likely to cooperate; for them, the
exposure to civil liability is smaller than the criminal penalties incurred if the
conspiracy is detected.
The firms with low probabilities of bearing the entire treble damage
awards are those with low net worths relative to their co-conspirators, or even
insolvent conspirators. For this reason, a conspirator with a relatively low net
worth is likely to be the amnesty applicant. On the opposite end of the
spectrum, for conspirators with deep pockets, the likelihood that they will bear
the entire burden of treble damages in a civil action--even when they are the
amnesty applicant--overwhelms the modest benefit from the immunity from
28 As discussed later, this analysis uses net worth as a proxy for the probability of bearing the
entire amount of treble damages, as antitrust victims usually sue the conspirator(s) with the deepest
pockets.
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criminal sanctions. Each conspirator, depending on its net worth, faces a
different disincentive to cooperate. Thus, the previous regime provided
incentives for low net worth conspirators to cooperate.
29
While the Justice Department does not disclose the identities of amnesty
applicants, available information suggests that amnesty applicants were among
the lower net worth conspirators. The Justice Department's prosecution of an
international vitamin industry cartel is illustrative. In that case, the Justice
Department secured the cooperation of Rhone-Poulenc SA in 1999 as an
amnesty applicant. 30 Twelve other conspirators pled guilty to price-fixing and
paid criminal fines of up to $500 million each. 31 The criminal prosecution
spawned a number of civil suits. 32 While Rhone-Poulenc escaped paying a
criminal fine, the company did face liability in a subsequent civil trial, which
was settled by some of the defendants for an amount exceeding $2 billion.33
Rhone-Poulenc, the amnesty applicant, was the smallest company of the three
major conspirators. 34 In other Justice Department prosecutions prior to the
Antitrust Reform Act, the effect was similar.35 Under that regime, higher net
worth conspirators were still liable for both criminal fines and civil awards.
Civil plaintiffs could recover from any of the conspirators, thus increasing the
likelihood that they would recover the entire treble damages award.
The new regime under the Antitrust Reform Act alters these incentives
dramatically. The Act both increases criminal penalties from a maximum fine
of $10 million to $100 million for corporate defendants 36 and reduces the civil
burden on the amnesty applicant to the actual damages caused by that
conspirator. The non-cooperating conspirators are responsible for the remainder
of the treble damages; as before, those non-cooperating conspirators with the
29 The Leniency Policy prohibits the "leader" of the price-fixing cartel from receiving the
benefits of amnesty. LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 27. In some cases, but not all, the leader of the cartel
may be the company with the highest net worth. In those cases, the analysis presented here would
explain behavior among the remaining conspirators according to net worth.
30 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
31 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF Agree To Pay
Record Criminal Fines for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (May 20, 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/196at.htm.
32 These cases were eventually consolidated into a single class action in the District of
Columbia. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002).
33 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197 TFH, 2000 WL 1737867 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
2000) (describing settlement agreement); see also Waller, supra note 26, at 222 ("Three of the
defendants-BASF, Hoffman-La Roche, and Rhone-Poulenc-were responsible for paying $900
million of the total figure.").
34 See Richard Wolffe, Conspiracy Worthy of a Textbook, FIN. TIMES (London), May 22,
1999, at 5.
35 See Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Address at the ABA's Criminal Justice Section's Fifteenth Annual National Institute on White
Collar Crime: When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do
You Put a Price Tag on Individual Freedom? (Mar. 8, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.pdf) (discussing graphite electrodes, marine
construction, and fine art auctions prosecutions).
36 See Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 666 (2004).
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largest net worths are most likely to shoulder most, if not all, of the burden of
treble damages awarded in the resulting civil suit.37 When analyzed in terms of
incentives to cooperate, it becomes clear that the de-trebling provision of the
Act provides relatively stronger incentives for the company with the most at
risk in the civil case to come forward first in order to limit its civil liability. As
noted above, the decision for any firm turns on the benefit of immunity from
criminal penalties in comparison to the cost of increased civil exposure. In
comparison to the pre-2004 amendment regime, the criminal penalties have
increased ten-fold, while the civil exposure has shrunk due to the de-trebling of
damages. Aside from the impact of the change in magnitude of criminal
penalties, the change in civil liability should differentially impact the incentives
of higher net worth firms. Those are the firms that would have--due to their
relatively higher net worth compared to the other co-conspirators-had to pick
up the bill for the treble damages in the old regime. Now these firms can escape
that burden through cooperation. The lower net worth conspirators do not face
as large a gain from the reduced civil liability, because their chances of bearing
the entirety of the treble damages were always unlikely. As a result, for higher
net worth companies, the incentive to cooperate has increased. Under the new
regime, then, the highest net worth conspirators-those with the highest
probability of bearing the entirety of the treble damages-will be the most
likely amnesty applicants. Conversely, those conspirators with low net worths
or those that are judgment-proof have relatively lesser incentives to cooperate
because they are unlikely to shoulder the burden of the treble damages.
38
The conspirator with the deepest pockets will limit its liability to actual
damages, and the remainder of the treble damages award will be paid by the
resulting pool of civil defendants-likely to be less solvent and have a lower
average net worth. If that is the case, this change would affect the victims'
abilities to recover the total amount of treble damages awarded. Thus, in a very
real sense individual victims' recovery may suffer under the new regime.
Increased detection, therefore, comes at a price paid by plaintiffs in terms of the
probability of recovery.
IV. Conclusion
The trade-off between detection and private enforcement is inevitable in
the dual track system that the antitrust laws contemplate. Tinkering with one
aspect of this complicated mechanism necessarily implicates the others.
37 Again, because Congress has not provided for a right of contribution for conspirators in the
case of treble damages, the deepest pockets are likely to be burdened with the largest share of the
damages award. See supra note 13.
38 Of course, were there to be perfect information, even those with lesser incentives would
realize the inclination of their higher net worth co-conspirators to contact the Justice Department, and
may (depending on the possible payoffs) respond by racing to call the Department first.
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Congress should more explicitly consider the ramifications for civil
enforcement in amending the system: The possibility of reduced civil awards
must be weighed against the increased detection of conspiracies. The incentives
to self-report under the previous regime were dampened by the prospect of civil
liability and treble damages awards. These weakened incentives may have
produced under-detection of conspiracies, and, therefore, some antitrust victims
were never compensated in civil actions. The unintended costs of the increased
antitrust conspiracy detection and prosecution under the new amendments to
the Corporate Leniency Program may be that antitrust victims suffer not from
lack of detection or enforcement, but in recovering treble damage awards.
Since the Antitrust Reform Act includes a sunset provision and must be
reenacted in five years, 39 Congress should re-evaluate whether victims'
interests have in fact suffered and whether the trade-off between detection and
recoverability was the correct one.
39 See Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 211(a), 118 Stat. 665, 666 (2004).
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